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Abstract
This study overturns the conclusion of a 1990 study by David Humphrey and
Allen Berger, which found that check ﬂoat is responsible for the popularity of
checks despite their high resource cost compared to electronic payment instru-
ments. The new study examines recent data on the costs of checks and automated
clearinghouse (ACH) payments. It ﬁnds that the value of check ﬂoat has decreased
signiﬁcantly since the 1990 study and is no longer large enough to make checks
more attractive than ACH payments. The study also questions whether the idea
that ﬂoat could be responsible for the persistent use of checks is reasonable given
standard assumptions about the behavior of economic agents. The study ends by
speculating on why checks are used more than less-costly alternatives and by
encouraging policymakers to wait for researchers to adequately answer that
question before intervening in the market for payment instruments.
The views expressed herein are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.Despite the growing availability and acceptance of elec-
tronic payment instruments—such as credit cards, debit
cards,andautomatedclearinghouse(ACH)payments—by
far the most popular noncash payment instrument used in
theUnitedStatesisthepapercheck.In1995,approximate-
ly 80 percent of all noncash transactions were made by
check (Bank for International Settlements, forthcoming).
Furthermore, although use of electronic instruments has
grown in the past several years, check use has grown as
well: between 1987 and 1993, the average annual number
of payments per capita increased by 26 payments for elec-
tronic instruments, but by 31 payments for checks (Hum-
phrey, Pulley, and Vesala, forthcoming). Clearly, individ-
uals and businesses are not rapidly shifting away from
checks to electronic instruments.1
The popularity of checks persists even though checks
cost society more to produce and process than do elec-
tronicinstruments.Accordingtostandardeconomictheory,
that may be a sign that the market for payment instruments
is not working properly. In general, in an efficient market,
when competing goods are available and one costs society
more, the prices of the goods will reﬂect the relative costs
of the resources used to produce them, and the cheaper
good will be substituted for the more expensive. In this
way, society uses its resources to produce only the partic-
ular goods it wants in the particular amounts it wants. In
other words, resources are used efficiently. When use does
not shift to the cheaper good, either the goods are not close
substitutes or the market has failed, and there is a potential
role for a public authority to attempt to correct the failure.
Market failure is a commonly accepted view of what’s
happened in the market for payment instruments. Accord-
ing to this view, the users of checks are the check writers.
And for those individuals and businesses, the private cost,
or price, of using checks has been distorted by the value of
check ﬂoat, or the time between the writing and clearing of
a check. During that time, of course, the funds can earn in-
terest for the check writer rather than for the check receiv-
er. The size of this beneﬁt is thought to have reduced the
price of check use below the cost to society of producing
and processing checks. Since individuals and businesses
don’t face that higher social cost, they continue to use
checks despite the existence of other means of payment
thatarelesscostlytosociety.Inshort,checksareoverused.
This study questions that common view. Here I focus
on the choice between paper checks and ACH payments,
or automatic electronic payments made through selected
ﬁnancialinstitutions.
2Whilecreditanddebitcardsareelec-
tronic substitutes for checks, those instruments are used
primarily by individuals for discretionary transactions. In
contrast, the ACH network was designed to accommodate
several types of fund transfers, including business pay-
ments to consumers and other businesses, consumer pay-
mentstobusinesses,andgovernmentpaymentstoconsum-
ers and businesses. Therefore, ACH payments may be
viewed as a close substitute for several types of check pay-
ments. Consumers commonly use ACH payments to pay
recurring utility, mortgage, and insurance bills; businesses
use them to make payroll and dividend payments and to
facilitate cash concentration and disbursement. My exami-
nation of the cost data on ACH and check payments does
not support the idea that the value of check ﬂoat is large
enough to create a signiﬁcant difference between the pri-
vate and social costs of check payments or to cause the
overuse of checks. I also question whether, aside from the
data, the notion that ﬂoat is to blame for the persistent use
of checks actually makes sense.
But if the common view is mistaken, why are checks
stillusedmorethanelectronicpaymentinstrumentsdespite
their cost differences? Is there a role for the public authori-
ty in this arena, the central bank, to provide incentives in
this market? Are checks overused or not? I don’t have
deﬁnitive answers to those questions, but I do have a few
speculations.
Oneisthatperhapschecksarenotoverused.Thiswould
be true, for example, if the cost data do not accurately re-
ﬂect the costs of the competing payment instruments. If
checks are actually not more costly to society than elec-
tronic instruments, then there should be little incentive, in
an efficient market, for users to shift to a different means
of payment. Checks would also not necessarily be over-
used if they and the other instruments are viewed not as
close substitutes, but rather as different types of goods, not
in direct competition. In either of these situations, there is
no market problem for the central bank to solve.
Then again, perhaps checks are overused, not because
ofﬂoat,butbecauseofanothersortofmarketfailure.ACH
payments typically require signiﬁcant ﬁxed expenditures
before they can be used by a business. For a single busi-
ness, that cost may exceed the beneﬁt of using such pay-
ments. Yet if many businesses used ACH payments, the
beneﬁts to all would increase and the use of checks would
decrease, along with the cost of transactions to society as
a whole. If this were true, then some sort of third-party
interventionmightbenecessarytoencouragebusinessesto
become part of an ACH network.
But, again, this is mere speculation. Before the central
bank acts to encourage or discourage the use of any par-
ticular payment instruments, further research needs to be




Past data on the private and social costs of various pay-
ment instruments supported the common view that the
value of check ﬂoat is to blame for the persistent use of
checks. However, updated data contradict that view. And
aside from the data, the view is hard to accept.
Float’s to Blame
One inﬂuential study of 1987 data supports the common
view. Humphrey and Berger (1990) used these data to cal-
culate, for nine types of payment instrument, the total so-
cial cost, the value of real resources consumed in the use
of the instrument, and the private cost, the price faced by
its user, which Humphrey and Berger saw as the payment
originator, or payor. This study found that social costs
were higher for checks than for most electronic instru-
ments. Again, in an efficient market, that difference in
social costs would imply that a large proportion of total
paymentswouldbemadeusinglow-costelectronicmedia.
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Yet Humphrey and Berger found that the use of noncash
instrumentsdidnotcorrespondwiththeircost;speciﬁcally,
checks were used much more than electronic instruments.
(See Humphrey and Berger 1990, p. 50, Table 2-1.)
According to Humphrey and Berger, the disparity be-
tween use and cost was the result of the high value ofcheck ﬂoat. Indeed, they calculated that the ﬂoat value for
an average check effectively reduced the price for the
check writer below the social cost: ﬂoat was a wedge be-
tween a check’s social and private cost. In the 1987 data,
check ﬂoat actually reversed the cost difference between
check and ACH payments. [See the accompanying table,
columns (1) and (2).] Humphrey and Berger concluded
that the ﬂoat wedge represented a failure in the market for
payment instruments and caused an overuse of checks.
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Humphrey and Berger also separated check users into
two major groups, businesses and consumers, and demon-
strated that the ﬂoat value was greater for an average busi-
ness check than for an average consumer check. In fact,
because the ﬂoat value of an average consumer check was
small, the private cost of checks for consumers was posi-
tive and still greater than the cost of ACH payments. Thus,
Humphrey and Berger argued that the payment instrument
market was failing primarily for business check payments.
(See Humphrey and Berger 1990, p. 54, Table 2-2.)
No, It’s Not
Updated Data
Recent data overturn the major conclusion of Humphrey
and Berger’s (1990) study.
6 [See the accompanying table,
columns (3) and (4).] Data on the costs of check and ACH
payments in 1993 conﬁrm that the total social cost is high-
er for an average check payment than for an average ACH
payment. Yet in the 1993 data, the value of check ﬂoat no
longer reverses the cost difference between the two instru-
ments: the private cost for an average check payment is
also higher than that for an average ACH payment. This
relationship holds when the value of ﬂoat for an average
business check is subtracted from the total social cost.
The main reason for this new conclusion is that the
value of ﬂoat for all checks has decreased signiﬁcantly
since the Humphrey and Berger (1990) study. I estimate
that, in real terms, between 1987 and 1993, the value of
ﬂoat for an average check payment dropped from $1.04 to
$0.09, or about 90 percent.
The reasons for this dramatic drop in the value of ﬂoat
are primarily greater efficiency in check processing and
lower short-term interest rates. Both the labor and capital
involved in check processing became more efficient be-
tween 1987 and 1993. During that time, for example, the
Bank Administration Institute (1994) estimates that check
encoding labor productivity at commercial banks, mea-
sured in items encoded per hour, increased about 24 per-
cent. Over the same period, the productivity of reader-
sorters (the high-speed equipment used to process checks),
measured in items processed per hour, increased 18 per-
cent. These productivity increases have expedited check
clearing. At the same time, the amount of interest that ﬂoat
allows check users to earn shrank considerably. For exam-
ple, between 1987 and 1993, the average three-month sec-
ondarymarketU.S.Treasurybillratefellabout50percent,
from 5.78 to 3.00 percent (FR Board, various dates).
Despite the dramatic drop in the value of ﬂoat, the use
of checks has not decreased. In fact, estimates by the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System indi-
cate that the annual number of checks written between
1987 and 1993 actually increased about 20 percent (Bank
for International Settlements, various dates). Recent data,




That view is suspect even if the data still supported it,
though. The view seems to assume that only the agent on
one side of a transaction—the check writer—recognizes
and takes advantage of the value of ﬂoat. That assumption
doesn’t correspond with expected rational behavior. Since
ﬂoat is a transfer payment from the check receiver to the
check writer, with no allocative effects overall, rational
agents are likely to negotiate a mutually beneﬁcial distri-
bution of any signiﬁcant value of ﬂoat.7 And, in fact, this
typeofnegotiationiscommonforlargepaymentsbetween
businesses, for which the value of ﬂoat is potentially large.
Inpractice,manybusiness-to-businesspaymentscontractu-
allystipulate paymenttransactiontermsthat internalizethe
effects of ﬂoat.8 (See Hollis 1990 and Knudson, Walton,
and Young 1994.)
Speculations
So the common view of failure in the market for payment
instruments is mistaken. The value of check ﬂoat is not
large enough to create a signiﬁcant difference between the
social and private costs of check use. And even if that
value were large, check writers and receivers would in-
ternalize its effect in their payment decision-making pro-
cess. Why, then, are checks used more than less-costly
alternatives? This question has yet to be satisfactorily an-
swered. Here I offer a few answers that might be worth
investigating.
Measurement Error?
One possibility is that the cost data for the competing pay-
ment instruments are measured with error. If this is true,
then check payments may not cost more that ACH pay-
ments; that is, in a well-functioning market, users of the
different types of instruments may have little incentive to
shift from paper to electronic instruments. I see three rea-
sons to question the available measurements of costs.
One isthatin the1993 datathecosts ofcheck andACH
businesspaymentprocessinghavenotbeenexplicitlymea-
sured.Thesecostsarerepresentedinsteadbydataprovided
by the Hackett Group, a management consulting ﬁrm (re-
ported in Barr 1993). The Hackett Group produced these
data in its attempt to measure cost efficiency in corporate
ﬁnancetransactionprocessing.Itanalyzedselectedﬁnance
processing functions of its corporate clients, including cus-
tomer billing, payroll, accounts payable, and accounts re-
ceivable. Based on this analysis, the Hackett Group es-
timated a labor cost per invoice, paycheck, or remittance;
compared the results for each client to the results for all of
them; and provided “best practice” unit costs. The Hackett
Group also provided average unit costs for its clients and
unitcosts forthose in thetop quarter(those withthe lowest
unit costs). I used the Hackett Group’s average unit costs
to approximate check processing costs and its top quarter
unit costs to approximate ACH processing costs. While
these are the best available cost estimates for my purposes,
they do not explicitly measure the costs of check and ACH
processing. Therefore, they may have a large margin of
error.
Anothermeasurementconcernisthatbusinesscheckre-
ceiver, or payee, costs are overstated. To estimate the busi-
ness cost of receiving check payments from consumers, Iused the Hackett Group estimate of the average labor cost
per accounts receivable invoice. Yet this estimate ignores
the amount of consumer check payments that are pro-
cessed by so-called lockbox operations. These operations
are high-volume processing centers to which customer
paymentsaresentandprocessedonhigh-speedequipment.
They are presumably less costly to run than individual
business accounts receivable operations. Anecdotal evi-
dence suggests that the average per-item fee for lockbox
processing, including the cost to process and deposit each
item,isabout$0.20–$0.25. Ifhalfofallconsumerbillpay-
ments were processed and deposited by lockbox opera-
tions, at a cost of $0.20 each, then the total check payee
cost should drop from $1.25 to $0.92.
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AthirdmeasurementconcernisthatbusinessACHpay-
ee costs are understated. I assumed that the cost to a busi-
ness to receive an ACH credit payment is zero. Although
no business processing cost is associated with the receipt
of an ACH credit, a business must nonetheless reconcile
individual credit payments with outstanding invoices. For
some businesses, this process is automated; information
from the ACH credit ﬁle is electronically matched with
information in an accounts payable ﬁle. For other busi-
nesses, the process is manual; information on individual
credit payments is sent from the processing ﬁnancial insti-
tution to the business on paper. Either way, the labor costs
associatedwithreconcilementaregreaterthanzero,andfor
the manual process, they could be signiﬁcant.
Different Goods?
Another possible explanation for the persistent use of
checks despite their relatively high social cost is that users
seechecksandelectronicpaymentinstrumentsnotasclose
substitutes for each other, but rather as very different in-
struments. Checks may be used more, in other words, sim-
ply because users prefer them to other ways of making
payments.
That notion is supported by anecdotal evidence. It sug-
geststhatconsumersgainsigniﬁcantnonquantiﬁablebene-
ﬁts from using checks. These beneﬁts may come from the
control associated with having a physical instrument to
originate or receive a payment. With an ACH payment,
consumers don’t get that control; payments are automati-
cally debited from or credited to the consumer’s account.
Although some consumers consider this automatic feature
a convenience, others don’t like it. Indeed, the primary ob-
jection to ACH payments may be not that they are elec-
tronic, but rather that they are automatic.
Check payments provide certain beneﬁts to businesses
as well. For example, for most business-to-business pay-
ments, remittance information is attached to the payment.
With checks, that information is easily attached as a paper
invoice. But attaching remittance information to an ACH
payment requires that businesses have particular software
that lets them send and receive remittance information in
the standard electronic format, a process known as ﬁnan-
cial electronic data interchange, or EDI. Financial EDI
can be costly to implement, so some businesses may pre-
fer to maintain a check processing system.
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Market Failure?
There’s at least one other possibility to consider. Maybe
the persistent use of checks is a sign that the market for
paymentinstrumentshasfailedbecauseofsomethingother
than a high value of check ﬂoat distorting the price of
check use. Maybe, for example, the problem is due to the
high ﬁxed costs that businesses face to adopt electronic
payments.
In order to begin sending or receiving ACH payments,
a business must buy and install computer software (and
possibly hardware) and incur other startup expenses, such
as manual processing of ACH enrollment forms. And the
business must continue to maintain its check processing
capability, since for some time ACH payments would dis-
place only a fraction of its check payments. Depending on
its payment volume, an individual business may not save
enough at the margin to justify the extra ACH expenses.
An individual business, that is, will choose to be part of an
ACH network only if its cost of doing so is less than its
private beneﬁts. Yet as more and more users adopt ACH
payments, beneﬁts to all users, or social beneﬁts, increase
(Katz and Shapiro 1994). Without some outside interven-
tion to encourage businesses to join ACH networks, these
electronic payment instruments may be underused from a
social efficiency viewpoint.
Conclusion
Are checks overused? Recent data on the relative costs of
checks and ACH payments seem to say, no, at least not
for the reason commonly believed. The data clearly show
that the value of check ﬂoat is not responsible for the
continued popularity of checks despite their high resource
cost compared to electronic payment instruments. Checks
might be overused for other reasons, however—but, then
again, they might not be overused at all. More research is
needed to determine whether or not they are—and if so,
why—before policymakers decide to intervene in the mar-
ket for payment instruments.
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Appendix
Data Construction: 1987 vs. 1993
Here I describe how I constructed the 1993 check and ACH cost
datadiscussedintheprecedingpaper.Ialsocomparemymethod
with Humphrey and Berger’s (1990) construction of the 1987
data.
In General
Humphrey and Berger estimated the total social costs of each
type of payment instrument by summing the costs associated
withproduction(coststomanufacturepaymentinstruments),use
(costs to originate and receive payments), and processing (costs
to clear and settle the payments, incurred by banks and other ﬁ-
nancial institutions). (For a detailed description of their calcu-
lations, see Humphrey and Berger 1990, Table 2-A2, notes e, f,
and k.) For each type of instrument, they divided the total social
cost by the estimated annual volume of items to calculate an
average per-item social cost. I replicated this method of sum-
ming the three cost components for check and ACH payments.
However, I used an alternative data set as well as an alternative
approach to calculate some of the components.
The differences between my approach and Humphrey and
Berger’s are most signiﬁcant for the use and processing cost es-
timates. For example, Humphrey and Berger relied on a single
data source for an estimate of payor cost. I assumed instead that
different types of payments have different costs. So my total
payor cost is constructed of various cost estimates for each in-
strument type weighted by each payment type’s percentage of
total payment volume. Also, Humphrey and Berger did not pro-
vide a separate estimate of payee cost, whereas I constructed
check and ACH payee costs using the same weighting method
I used for payor costs. Finally, Humphrey and Berger used a
single data source for bank processing costs that may not repre-
sent the population of bank processors. Instead of using a single
datasource,Icalculatedarangeofestimatesforbankprocessing
costs based on various data sources.
Before beginning a detailed discussion of the cost data, I
should highlight two assumptions. First, since marginal cost is
the relevant measure in questions of microeconomic choice, I
assumed for each component of the social cost calculations that
average cost approximates marginal cost. To the extent that
ACH processing is characterized by a cost structure in which
marginal costs are below average costs—that is, by increasing
returnstoscale—thisassumptionisproblematic.BauerandHan-
cock (1995) demonstrated that economies of scale exist for Fed-
eral Reserve System ACH processing. Similar empirical evi-
dence, however, does not currently exist for commercial bank or
business ACH processing. For the bank and business cost com-
ponents of total ACH social cost, therefore, the assumption of
averagecostequaltomarginalcostisanopenempiricalquestion.
Second, the 1987 and 1993 check cost calculations rely ex-
tensively on a relatively old commercial check usage study pub-
lished by the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta in 1983. This
study estimated that 55 percent of all commercial checks were
written by consumers (7 percent to obtain cash, 18 percent for
retail transactions, and 30 percent for bills and other payments),
40 percent of all checks were written by businesses (10 percent
for payrolls, 10 percent to consumers, and 20 percent to other
businesses), and 5 percent of all checks were written by state
and local governments. Checks written by the federal govern-
ment were not included in the Atlanta Fed study: in 1993 these
checks constituted less than 1 percent of total checks (FR Board
1993, p. 297; Bank for International Settlements 1994, p. 110).
Because of payment innovations and changes in payment prac-
tices,thecompositionofcheckpaymentactivityislikelytohave
changed since 1983. If so, a bias is built into the 1987 and 1993
cost calculations. More recent data, however, are not available.
An updated usage study of this type would be extremely useful.
In Detail
Now I describe my data construction method in detail and com-
pare my method with that of Humphrey and Berger (1990).
Production Cost
Like Humphrey and Berger, I used prices from a check printing
company as an estimate of check production costs. My printing
estimate is a range that represents the prices of printing consum-
er checks ($0.02)and business checks ($0.04).The range is con-
servative because it does not include the prices of printing non-
standard checks, which cost more to produce. The range is also
conservative because the prices of printing do not necessarily
reﬂect the costs of printing; costs could be lower. Unlike Hum-
phrey and Berger, I also estimated the cost to distribute checks
to users. This is based on the 1993 cost to mail a box of checks
at third-class bulk rate ($0.004–$0.005). Although this cost is
small on a per-item basis, it is appropriate to include in the es-
timate of production costs.
I assumed, as did Humphrey and Berger, that because no
tangible instrument is associated with an ACH payment, ACH
production costs are zero. This assumption is not completely ac-
curate, of course, because there is a data transmission cost as-
sociated with sending an ACH ﬁle from a business to a bank.
However,sinceoneACHﬁletypicallycontainsmanyindividual
payments, the data transmission cost per payment is negligible.
Processing Cost: Users
Payors
For both check and ACH payments, Humphreyand Berger used
data from a 1983 study of payment transaction costs for the U.S.
Treasury’s direct deposit program as an estimate of business and
governmentpayorcost(Dudley1983).(Thestudycomparedthe
costofgovernmentpayments madebychecksandACH.)Using
these estimates has two problems. One is that the study’s cost
data are from ﬁscal year 1981 and are not adjusted to 1987 lev-
els. The other problem is that using just one estimate to rep-
resent a heterogeneous population of payors is rather limiting.
To account for variation in payor type, I constructed weight-
ed payor cost estimates for both check and ACH payments. The
estimates are based on data that represent costs associated with
various types of payment transactions. The cost of each type of
payment transaction is multiplied by a weight that represents the
proportion of total payments accounted for by each transaction
type.
For checks, these payment transactions and weights follow
the Atlanta Fed (1983) study’s check payment categories: con-
sumerpayments, businesspayments, andstate andlocal govern-
ment payments. Consumer check payments, whether to obtain
cash, to make retail transactions, or to pay bills, involve an op-
portunity cost of time spent writing a check. Quantiﬁable esti-
mates of opportunity cost for these activities, however, are not
available and are difficult to construct. Since the per-itemoppor-
tunity cost is probably small, I assumed it is zero. This assump-
tion is different from Humphrey and Berger’s; they assumed
that consumer payor cost is zero because consumers do not
have the opportunity to get paid for the time saved if they did
not write checks.
For business payment costs, I used data estimated by the
HackettGroup,amanagementconsultingﬁrmthatanalyzescost
efficiency in corporate transaction processing (Barr 1993). For
business payroll payments, I used the Hackett Group’s estimateof the average labor cost per payroll payment ($2.56). For busi-
ness payments to consumers and to other businesses, I used the
Hackett Group’s estimate of the average labor cost per accounts
receivable invoice ($3.00). The weights associated with these
transactions are 10, 10, and 20 percent, respectively.
Finally, for state and local government check costs, I used
U.S. Treasury data from ﬁscal year 1993 that include all direct
and support costs (including printing and postage) for checks
written by the federal government beneﬁt disbursement pro-
grams($0.32).Becausethescaleoffederalgovernmentpayment
processingislargeandtherebypotentiallycharacterizedbyscale
economies, using Treasury data to approximate state and local
government check processing costs may bias the government
estimate downward. Yet bias in the total payor estimate is not
large, because government checks are weighted at 5 percent of
total commercial checks. My total check payor cost estimate is
$1.18 per check.
This payor estimate is sensitive to the assumed weight given
to each type of check payor and each type of payment. For ex-
ample, if I use a different weighting in which business checks
constitute 50 rather than 40 percent of all checks written, the
payor estimate is $1.56 rather than $1.18. By contrast, if con-
sumer checks are assumed to constitute 70 rather than 55 per-
cent of all checks written, the payor estimate is only $0.88.
For ACH payments, I also constructed the payor estimate
based on the weighted cost of various ACH payment transac-
tions. These transactions are credit originations by the federal
government for beneﬁt payments (26 percent of total), credit
originations by businesses to consumers (32 percent) and to oth-
er businesses (6 percent), and debit originations by businesses
tocollect paymentsfrom consumers(29 percent)and fromother
businesses (6 percent). (These data are based on my calculations
from internal Federal Reserve ACH processing data.)
ForgovernmentACHcredits,IusedU.S.Treasurydatafrom
ﬁscal year 1993 that includes all direct and support costs for
ACH beneﬁt payments ($0.057). Data for businesses sending
payroll payments by ACH ($2.01) and sending ACH payments
to other businesses ($2.29) are average labor costs from the
Hackett Group (Barr 1993). Costs associated with originating
ACH debit transactions are in the payee cost estimate because
the payee incurs the cost of originating the payment. My total
ACH payor estimate is $0.80 per ACH payment.
The business payor costs based on the Hackett Group data
may be overstated. The Hackett Group estimates are labor costs
associatedwith transactionprocessing, which maybe somewhat
higher than the incremental cost of making or receiving a pay-
ment. For example, in order to make a vendor payment, a busi-
nessreviews thevendorinvoice,ensures thatthegood orservice
has been delivered, and updates its accounts payable data base.
The payment process up to this point is standard regardless of
how the payment was eventually made. On the due date, the
business either generates a check for the invoice amount or in-
cludes the payable information in an ACH ﬁle that it gives to its
bank. An accurate measure of the payment-related cost of this
process, therefore, would capture the cost of writing a check or
originating an ACH ﬁle. Unfortunately, such detailed estimates
are not readily available. Since corporate payment processing
involves a close link between accounting and payment systems,
however, perhaps the Hackett Group’s estimates are a more
inclusive measure of payor costs.
Postage
As an estimate of total postage costs associated with check
payments, Humphrey and Berger multiplied annual pieces of
payment-related mail by the cost of ﬁrst-class postage ($0.22)
and an envelope ($0.02) at the time of their study; in 1993
dollars, this totals $0.41. To estimate payment-related mail, they
used data from 1978 and 1980 University of Michigan studies
on mail classiﬁcation. They deﬁned payment-related mail as
bills sent by businesses to consumers and bill payments sent by
consumers to businesses or both. In my approach, I multiplied
the 1993 cost of ﬁrst-class postage ($0.29) and an envelope
($0.01) by the weights for consumer checks written to pay bills
(30 percent) and business checks written to pay other than pay-
rolls (30 percent). My total postage estimate is $0.18 per check.
Humphrey and Berger calculated a postage cost for ACH
payments as well. They deﬁned this as the cost to businesses to
mail invoices that are paid by consumers using ACH. I assumed
that businesses usually mail invoices to consumers regardless of
theconsumer’s formof payment. Thus,including thiscost in the
total postage cost for either check or ACH payments is not
appropriate. In other words, invoice postage is a general cost of
doing business rather than a payment cost.
Payees
HumphreyandBergerdidnot calculateaseparatepayeecost for
either check or ACH payments. The cost to receive and process
a check or an ACH payment, however, can be signiﬁcant and
should be included in the total social cost. I calculated payee
cost for check and ACH payments using the same weighted
method I used for payor cost.
For check payments, the relevant payees are retailers, busi-
nesses receiving consumer bill payments, and businesses re-
ceiving payments from other businesses. To estimate retailer
costs, I used data from a Food Marketing Institute (1994) study
on the cost of processing a consumer check less bank charges
($0.37). This study provided comprehensive cost data on super-
market check transaction costs; I assumed that costs associated
with the payment process at supermarkets could be generalized
to represent costs for other types of retailers. For business costs
to receive consumer and business checks, I used the Hackett
Group’s data on the average labor cost to process an accounts
receivable payment ($2.35) (Barr 1993). The weights for these
transactions are 18 percent, 30 percent, and 20 percent, respec-
tively. My total check payee estimate is $1.25 per check.
1
For ACH payments, the relevant payees are businesses orig-
inating ACH debits and consumers and businesses receiving
ACH credits. For business costs to originate an ACH debit item,
I used the Hackett Group’s data on accounts receivable payment
processing ($0.66) (Barr 1993). The weight for this transaction
is 35 percent. Consumers and businesses incur no opportunity
cost when receiving an ACH credit; therefore, it was set to zero.




To estimate bank check processing costs, Humphrey and Berger
usedFunctionalCostAnalysis(FCA)data.FCAisaservice,ad-
ministered by the Federal Reserve System, that calculates cost
and proﬁtability measures of various bank functions or opera-
tions. Participants in the FCA sample typically are smaller ﬁ-
nancialinstitutionsthatdonothaveresourcestoperforminternal
cost analysis. Therefore, cost data from this sample are mainly
for small banks, which have atypically high costs.
Since the cost of check processing operations at commercial
banks can vary greatly depending on a bank’s size and scale of
operation, I calculated a range of estimates based on bank cost
data from several sources.
First,torepresentbankswithsmaller-scalecheckprocessing,
IreplicatedHumphreyandBerger’sapproach.They constructed
their estimate by summing the costs of processing a check de-
posit, a transit deposit, an on-us debit, and a return item and the
cost of returning checks to customers. Using this approach with
1993 FCA data (FR Board 1994), I calculated an estimate of
$0.41 per check.
As a second calculation of bank check processing costs, I
used data from the 1993 Bank Administration Institute’s (1994)
survey, which was not available to Humphrey and Berger. In-
cluded in this sample are banks of four asset sizes. The surveyprovides unit cost estimates based on statistical medians for pro-
cessing transit and on-us check deposits ($0.05), paid checks
($0.067), andreturned items($0.03). Summingthese threecom-
ponentsgivesanestimate oftotal bankprocessingcostsof $0.15
per check.
While the Bank Administration Institute’s survey is one of
the few banking industry sources for check processing cost data,
the unit cost data are not estimated using statistical techniques.
Unit costs are reported by the survey respondents rather than
calculated from the cost and volume data provided by them. So
each respondent likely uses a different method to estimate unit
costs for various check processing operations. For example,
someof therespondents arelikelyto includecorporate overhead
allocations in their estimates while others do not.
Therefore, as a third calculation of bank check processing
costs, I used data from two other sources. One is the Federal
Reserve System. I used internal cost and revenue data for the
check processing operations of Federal Reserve Banks. I as-
sumed that a Federal Reserve Bank’s commercial check pro-
cessing costs approximate those of a commercial bank with a
larger-scale operation. While the Federal Reserve Banks obvi-
ously differ from commercial banks, many check processing
operations of the Federal Reserve and commercial banks are
similar. Both receive and sort deposits, handle adjustments and
return items, and send checks for presentment at paying banks.
Thegreatest advantage of using Federal Reservecost data is that
thedataarenearly all-inclusive;theycapturedirect, support,and
overhead costs; the cost of ﬂoat; the cost of reserves; the cost of
federal deposit insurance; and the cost of sales taxes.
2
One aspect of commercial bank check processing for which
Federal Reserve services are not a close substitute is processing
at the paying bank.
3 Costs to the paying bank include sorting
paid checks, returning checks to customers, and providing state-
ments to customers. For an estimate of paying bank costs, there-
fore, I turned to another source: a Payment Systems, Inc. (1994)
study on the average cost of a check drawn on a bank. This pay-
ing bank cost estimate is based on cost data collected from a
sample of 100 banks stratiﬁed by asset size. Costs included in
the estimate are fees, data processing, personnel, hardware, soft-
ware, overhead, and exception item costs. Adding the deposit
costs ($0.027) to paying bank costs ($0.105) gives a total bank
processing cost of $0.13 per check.
Finally, to each of the three alternatives for bank check pro-
cessing costs, I added the cost to banks of losses from check
fraud ($0.014) and the cost of capital ($0.002). These compo-
nents were excluded by Humphrey and Berger. Data on check
fraud losses are from an American Bankers Association (1994b)
survey, and the cost of capital is based on the capital cost model
of the Federal Reserve Banks (Federal Register 1993). The total
per-itemcostofthesetwocomponentsis$0.016.Adding$0.016
to the three alternatives for bank check processing costs gives a
range of from $0.15 to $0.43 per item.
ACH Payments
I also used several data sources to estimate ACH processing
costs. These costs include the costs of ACH network operators
as well as those of commercial banks. To calculate ACH opera-
tor costs, I used internal Federal Reserve ACH processing cost
data ($0.038) for 1993. These data include all direct, support,
and overhead costs as well as the imputed cost of sales taxes. I
assumed that Federal Reserve operator costs approximate those
of the three private-sector operators, who clear about 15 percent
of all ACH items.
For commercial bank costs of processing ACH payments, I
used three estimates. The ﬁrst is based on a study prepared by
the Payment Systems Network (1994). In that study, banks stat-
ed that ACH operator fees constitute 10 to 25 percent of their
total ACH processing costs. Applyingthese percentages toaver-
age Federal Reserve Bank ACH fees for 1993 gives estimates
of from $0.15 to $0.38 per ACH item.
As a second estimate of bank costs of processing ACH pay-
ments, I used data from another American Bankers Association
(1994a) survey. This survey provided estimates of banks’ ACH
processing costs thatrange from $0.14 to $0.33. Theseestimates
are based on bank asset size and represent only direct costs. Al-
so, data from this survey are somewhat problematic because,
like the Bank Administration Institute’s data, they are provided
by respondents rather than calculated from actual cost and pay-
ment volume data.
For a third estimate of banks’ ACH processing costs, I used
data from the Payment Systems, Inc. (1994) study on the cost to
a bank to process an ACH debit ($0.057).
Finally, to each of these three estimates, I added the per-item
cost of capital ($0.004) and the cost to process government
items multiplied by the proportion of ACH items that are gov-
ernment ($0.013). Humphrey and Berger excluded these com-
ponents. The per-unit capital cost is also based on the Federal
Reservemodel(FederalRegister1993).Thecosttoprocessgov-
ernment items is based on Federal Reserve cost data because the
Federal Reserve processes all government ACH items. The total
per-itemcostofthesetwocomponentsis$0.017.Adding$0.017
to the three estimates of bank ACH processing costs and to
ACH operator costs gives a range of from $0.12 to $0.44 per
ACH payment.
Float Cost
I calculated the average value of ﬂoat per check using Hum-
phrey and Berger’s (1990) algorithm: the average value of a
check multiplied by the average number of ﬂoat days per check
and the effective daily three-month U.S. Treasury bill rate (the
short-term money market rate at which available funds are as-
sumed to be invested). Based on Federal Reserve estimates of
the dollar value and the number of checks processed in 1993,
the average value of a check is $1,150 ($68.3 trillion divided by
59.4 billion checks) (Bank for International Settlements, various
dates). I assumed that the average number of ﬂoat days is one
since the Bank Administration Institute (1994) estimated that in
1993 items in an average cash letter cleared in one day, includ-
ing items presented to the Federal Reserve, to private clearing-
houses,anddirectlytocorrespondents.Theaveragethree-month
secondary market Treasury bill rate in 1993 was 3 percent (FR
Board, various dates). Based on these data, the ﬂoat value of an
average check is $0.09.
I estimate that the ﬂoat value of an average business check is
$0.21.Thisiscalculatedasaresidualoftheformulafortheover-
all average value of a check: (The average dollar value of a con-
sumer check × The proportion of all checks written by consum-
ers) + (The average dollar value of a government check × The
proportionofallcheckswrittenbygovernments)+(Theaverage
dollar value of a business check × The proportion of all checks
written by businesses). The proportions here are, respectively,
55 percent, 40 percent, and 5 percent (Federal Reserve Bank of
Atlanta 1983). In 1993, the overall average value of a check was
$1,150 (according to Federal Reserve estimates), the average
value of a consumer check was $140 (according to my calcula-
tions based on U.S. Departmentof Labor 1994), and the average
valueofagovernmentcheck(usingfederalgovernmentstatistics
to approximate the size of state and local government checks)
was $1,113 (480 million checks valued at $534.2 billion). Thus,
the average value of a business check was $2,543. Multiplying
$2,543 by the average number of ﬂoat days (1) and the short-
term interest rate (0.03/365) results in the ﬂoat value of an av-
erage business check: $0.21.
Unlike Humphrey and Berger (1990), however, I did not in-
clude mail ﬂoat in the average number of ﬂoat days. (Mail ﬂoat
constitutes 37 percent of their ﬂoat estimate).
4 To measure ﬂoat,
the relevant time gap is between the date payment is due (or for
retail purchases, the date payment is tendered) and the date
funds are debited from the payor’s account.
5 For the average
business-to-business or consumer-to-business check, this gap isone day: assuming that a check is forwarded by a business pay-
ee to its ﬁnancial institution on the payment day and that its ﬁ-
nancial institution forwards the item to the Federal Reserve,
clearinghouse,orcorrespondentbymidnightofthatday,thepay-
or’s account would be debited the following day. The payor
would have to fund its account on the day of the debiting, either
because of a contract with its ﬁnancial institution (using a con-
trolled disbursement service) or because of the need to have suf-
ﬁcient funds inits account when theﬁnancial institution updated
its demand deposit system on that day. For checks drawn on in-
stitutions outside the payee’s geographic area, the process may
take two days. Because of the lack of readily available data on
the percentage of check clearings that are not local, I assumed




1My caveat on the sensitivity of the check payor estimate to the assumed weight on each type of
transaction applies to the payee estimate as well.
2ThecostsoffederaldepositinsuranceandsalestaxesareimputedcostsbasedonwhattheFederal
Reserve would have paid if it were a private ﬁrm. These costs are imputed from a model based on data
from the 50 largest bank holding companies (Federal Register 1993).
3Federal Reserve Banks provide services to paying banks. However, not all of the services pro-
vided by the Federal Reserve Banks are comparable to payor processing at commercial banks.
4If mail ﬂoat is excluded from Humphrey and Berger’s calculation of ﬂoat for an average check,
theprivatecostofacheckbecomespositive,butitdoesnotexceedtheprivatecostofanACHpayment.
5Consumer-to-consumercheckpayments,suchasgiftpayments,havenopaymentduedate.Float
days for these checks can vary greatly, since some consumers delay in depositing them. Because con-
sumer-to-consumercheckslikelyconstituteasmallportionoftotalcheckpayments,thevariationinﬂoat
days for these checks does not greatly bias the assumption of one ﬂoat day per average check.
6The private cost results of the 1993 data are sufficiently robust so as not to be dependent on the
assumption of one ﬂoat day. If the number of ﬂoat days is doubled from one to two, average ﬂoat value
becomes $0.18 and the range of private cost of checks becomes $2.60–$2.91. That range is still greater
than the range of private costs of ACH payments.
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Production Cost
 
Printing .045 .00 .02–.04 .00
Distributing — .00 .004–.005 .00
Processing Cost
Users: Payors .14 .23 1.18 .80
Postage .41 .03 .18 .00
Payees — — 1.25 .23
Financial Institutions:
Clearing and Settlement .40 .11 .15–.43 .12–.44
Total Social Cost 1.00 .37 2.78–3.09 1.15–1.47
Float Cost 1.04 .00 .09 .00
Total Private Cost –.04 .37 2.69–3.00 1.15–1.47
ACH/Check Ratio
Social Cost .37 .41–.48
Private Cost –9.25 .43–.49
*The 1987 data are Humphrey and Berger’s (1990) data, but converted to 1993 dollars
using the annual-weighted chain-type price index used with the national income and
product accounts.
Sources: See the Appendix.
Why Use Checks?
Unit Social and Private Costs of Check and ACH Payments
in 1987 and 1993, in 1993 Dollars*
1987 Data* 1993 Data
(1) (2)
Checks ACH
(3) (4)
Checks ACH